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Three-Judge District Courts, Direct Appeals, and Reforming the
Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket
Michael E. Solimine *

Abstract: The “shadow docket” is the term recently given to a long-standing practice of the
United States Supreme Court, in granting or denying requests for stays of lower court decisions,
often on a hurried basis with rudimentary briefing and no oral argument, and with little if any
explanation by the Court or individual Justices. Recently the practice has received unusual
attention inside and outside the legal community, because of its apparently greater use by the
Court in high-profile cases, with the emergency orders often sought by the federal government or
state officials. Scholars have advanced various reforms to ameliorate the perceived problems of
the shadow docket. One suggestion is to require suits against federal statutes and policies to be
litigated before a specially convened three-judge district court, perhaps in the District of
Columbia, with a direct appeal to the Court. Supporters argue that this process would result in
more consistent decision making by the Court and lower courts.
This Essay critically examines the suggested reform. As its supporters acknowledge, the reform
would largely replicate the procedure Congress established from 1937 to 1976 for challenges to
the constitutionality of federal statutes. Congress abolished the special procedure in 1976, given
opposition from the federal judiciary and others, in part due to it being perceived as unnecessary,
and burdening the Court with mandatory appeals. The Essay first evaluates the recent suggestion
considering the prior experience, an evaluation that includes an empirical analysis of Supreme
Court decisions under the earlier process. It then considers proposals to establish exclusive
jurisdiction in the federal courts in the District of Columbia, which would reduce forum
shopping but deprive the Court of the benefits of percolation of multiple suits. The Essay
concludes that the suggested reform could ameliorate some of the problems of the shadow
docket, but should be undertaken with an appreciation of the decidedly mixed past experience
with similar institutional arrangements.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s so-called “shadow docket,” as coined by Professor William Baude 1 is not a
new phenomenon but is currently receiving unprecedented attention and critical scrutiny inside
and outside the legal community. 2 The term lacks a precise definition, but it usually refers to the
Court deciding emergency orders, granting or denying requests for stays of lower court
decisions, often on a hurried basis with rudimentary briefing and no oral argument, and with no
or limited explanation by the Court as a whole or individual Justices. This is dramatically
different from the Court’s regular order of business, which almost always involves ordinary
*
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litigation in the lower courts, followed by a fully-briefed (by the parties and frequently by amici
curiae) writ of certiorari, which the Court will take months to consider, which if granted will
result in more briefing, oral arguments, and a decision on the merits still more months later, with
a lengthy explanatory opinion. 3 Recently the practice has received attention because of its
seemingly greater use by the Court in high-profile cases involving immigration, environmental,
and COVID-regulatory policies, among others, with the orders often sought by the federal
government or by state attorneys general, and the perception that the Court uses the shadow
docket in inconsistent ways. 4 Shadow docket cases were prominent in the Court’s 2021 Term, 5
which by some accounts the Court decided over sixty such cases. 6
Critics of the shadow docket have suggested a variety of reforms, not to outlaw the process as
such, but to increase transparency and procedural regularity when it is used. One of those
reforms has been advanced by Professor Stephen Vladeck, a prominent chronicler and critic of
the modern shadow docket, 7 has proposed one way to reform the perceived ills of the docket: all
suits seeking injunctive relief against federal statutes and policies should be litigated before a
three-judge district court, with a direct appeal to the Court. 8 He argues that process would result
in more consistent decision making by the Court with a fuller record for an appeal. As Vladeck
acknowledges, his proposal is modeled after the process that governed similar litigation, as
mandated by Congress in 1937, that stood until repealed in 1976. Other scholars and
commentators have discussed or endorsed this reform. 9
This Essay critically examines Vladeck’s proposal considering that experience. Part I
summarizes the shadow docket and its precursors, the recent heightened controversy over the
practice, and reform proposals. Part II addresses the reasons Congress adopted the 1937 reform.
It notes that the special process for constitutional challenges came to be severely criticized by
3

See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court Should Eliminate Its Lawless Shadow Docket, 74 ADM. L. REV. 1, 12 (2022).
4
Id. at 2-4. See Part I infra.
5
See, e.g., Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022)(per curiam)(granting stay of relief ordered under Voting
Rights Act, and noting probable jurisdiction). For examples shortly before the 2021 Term officially started, see
Whole Women’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021)(per curiam)(not ordering stay of denial of challenge to
Texas law permitting private parties to enforce abortion restrictions); Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health
and Human Serv., 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021)(per curiam)(invalidating federal eviction moratorium).
6
Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Supreme Court Conservatives Want More Robust ‘Shadow Docket’(1),
Bloomberg Law, July 8, 2022 (documenting 66 shadow docket decisions during the 2021 Term).
7
See, e.g., STEPHEN I. VLADECK, THE SHADOW DOCKET: HOW THE SUPREME COURT USES STEALTH RULINGS TO
AMASS POWER--AND UNDERMINE THE REPUBLIC (Basic Books, forthcoming 2023); Stephen I. Vladeck, The
Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123 (2019)[hereinafter Vladeck, Solicitor General].
See also PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, DRAFT FINAL REPORT 228
n.9 (December 2021)(referring to Vladeck as “[t]he leading critic” of the Shadow Docket)[hereinafter BIDEN
COMMISSION REPORT].
8
Stephen I. Vladeck, F.D.R.’s Court-Packing Plan Had Two Parts. We Need to Bring Back the Second. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 7, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/07/opinion/supreme-court-vaccine-mandate.html [hereinafter
Vladeck, FDR Second Part]; Steve Vladeck, The Supreme Court is Handing Down its Fewest Decisions in Decades.
Here’s What That Means, MSNBC, June 4, 2022, https://www.msn.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/supreme-court-nodecision-bad-decision-it-s-happening-too-n1295991.
9
See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 3, at 17; Mark Joseph Stern, Congress Finally Scrutinizes One of SCOTUS’s Most
Disturbing Practices, Slate, Feb. 18, 2021. Other scholars have discussed the proposal or argued for its adoption for
other types of cases as well (e.g., requests for nationwide injunctions), which may overlap in part with cases on the
shadow docket. See Part I infra.
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many in the legal community and by the Court itself, due to the awkwardness of assembling
three judges to try the many challenges to federal and state statutes, coupled with the many
resulting direct appeals to the Court. The ostensibly mandatory appeals, which needed to be
decided on the merits, in the minds of many unnecessarily burdened the Court with cases that
could otherwise be litigated in the usual manner, of one district judge’s decision, with an appeal
as of right to a circuit court, followed by discretionary certiorari review by the Court. Due to the
criticisms, Congress largely abolished the 1937 reforms in 1976, leaving the arrangement intact
for only reapportionment cases. Most of the criticism of the 1937-1976 experience was focused
on the many suits against state statutes, and less so regarding the fewer suits challenging federal
statutes. Drawing on a database of Supreme Court decisions which considered the constitutional
of federal statutes, Part II includes an empirical analysis of the decisions from 1937 to 1976
which were on direct appeal from three-judge district courts.
Part III of the Essay utilizes the 1937 through 1976 experience, as well as other uses of threejudge district courts to govern challenges to particular federal statutes, as a baseline to evaluate
reintroducing the 1937 reform to ameliorate the perceived deficiencies of the modern shadow
docket. The related proposal to lodge venue of all challenges to federal statutes and policies in
the District of Columbia would eliminate forum shopping but generate its own concerns,
including depriving the Court of the advantages of percolation of issues among different federal
courts. The exclusive venue aspect has the advantages and disadvantages of any specialized
court, ranging from the expertise of a well-regarded federal court on administrative laws issues,
to the possibility of politicizing the judicial selection process for the court.
The Essay concludes that the three-judge district court with direct appeals, if adopted, could
ameliorate some of the problems with the modern shadow docket, but should be undertaken with
an appreciation for the mixed experience under similar institutional arrangements.
I.

THE SHADOW DOCKET AND ITS DISCONTENTS

The “shadow docket” lacks a precise definition, but the consensus seems to be that it refers to
decisions of the Supreme Court not on the “merits,” but on emergency orders, typically seeking a
stay of a lower court decision or of an action by the federal or state government. They are
decided with few of the characteristics of the merits cases, that is, full briefing, oral argument,
opportunity for amicus briefs to be filed, followed by a full explanatory decision months later.
Instead, they are typically rendered after limited briefing, no oral argument, and only days after
the request for an order, often with no or only limited explanation by the Court as a whole or by
individual Justices. 10
Despite the recent attention, the Court has had a shadow docket of some kind for almost a
century. The most obvious example are Court’s decisions on thousands of writs of certiorari filed
each Term, the vast majority of which are granted or denied with no additional opinion by the
Court or by individual Justices. Nor is concern over such decision-making anything new. As
Baude pointed out, decades earlier the Court, in varying degrees, had been called out for
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See, e.g., Baude, supra note 1, at 1-2; Pierce, supra note 3, at 1-3; BIDEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at
203-04.
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summarily reversing lower court decisions with brief per curiam opinions offering little or no
explanation, and often not in the context of requests for emergency orders as such. 11
Nonetheless, the practice appears to have accelerated in recent years. Professor Richard Pierce
attributes the change in part to party polarization and resulting less legislation passing in
Congress, and in consequence Presidential administrations of both parties relying on executive
orders and similar policymaking. In turn, state attorneys general of both parties, often acting in
concert, have frequently filed suits in federal court challenging those actions and seeking
nationwide injunctions against their implementation. 12 Whether acting alone or together, state
attorneys general often have forum-shopped and filed suit in a federal district court whose jurists
are presumably favorably disposed, by their record and ideological or political background, to
the relief sought in the suit. 13
Similarly, Professor Vladeck has examined the litigation strategies of the Solicitor General (SG),
representing the United States, and finds that in recent years, especially during the Trump
Administration, the SG has “aggressive[ly]” sought to “short-circuit the ordinarily course of
appellate litigation” by seeking stays of district court decisions in the Court. 14 Vladeck also
attributes the rise of the shadow docket to doctrinal shifts on the Court. In making such
decisions, Vladeck argues that the Court has often assumed that there is irreparable injury (one of
the prerequisites for a stay) whenever a district court enjoins a federal statute or policy, which
makes another prerequisite, the likelihood of success on the merits, almost always the controlling
factor. 15 Among other problems with the shadow docket, Vladeck contends that by frequently
inviting and granting extraordinary relief of district court decisions, the Justices deprive
themselves of the informational value of percolation of possible decisions by other district
courts, or of review by the Courts of Appeals. 16 He has also argued that the Court should avoid
the unsigned and unexplained decisions characteristic of the shadow docket since, he contends,
the practice reduces the public’s perception of the integrity and legitimacy of the Court. 17
Some have argued that the criticisms have been overblown. Justice Samuel Alito has argued in a
speech that the shadow docket is a “catchy and sinister term” which misleadingly suggests that
the Court “resorts to sneaky and improper methods to get its way.” Instead, Alito stated, the
Court had to act quickly on these “emergency orders” (his preferred term) because of the timesensitive nature of the lower court order being reviewed. 18 In other words, as the report of the
Biden Commission on the Supreme Court put it, the shadow docket arguably “is not
illegitimate,” and is simply a function of “the nature of emergency adjudication.” 19 On this
11

Baude, supra note 1, at 19-21 (discussing scholarly commentary and criticisms in the 1950s and 1960s). See also
BIDEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 203-04 (same).
12
Pierce, supra note 3, at 3, 10-12.
13
Id. at 12.
14
Vladeck, Solicitor General, supra note 7, at 125.
15
Id. at 126.
16
Id. at 153-58.
17
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Supreme Court Needs to Show Its Work, ATLANTIC, March 10, 2021,
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/supreme-court-needs-show-its-work/618338.
18
Adam Liptak, Alito Responds to Critics of the Supreme Court’s ‘Shadow Docket,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/30/us/politics/alito-shadow-docket-scotus.html.
19
BIDEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 205.
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account, there is nothing “inherently suspect about emergency orders,” and presumably no
fundamental reforms are necessary. Much of the recent controversy over the shadow docket
might be largely a function of deep policy disagreements over the substantive legal and policy
issues at stake in cases regarding such matters as the COVID pandemic, immigration issues, and
death penalty appeals. 20
Nonetheless, commentators with different views on the propriety of the shadow docket have
advanced or suggested a variety of reforms, such as enhancing transparency by the Court giving
reasons for the decision, especially when a lower court is reversed, and by revealing the votes of
Justices; bringing more clarity to the precedential effect (if any) of shadow docket decisions,
whether reasoned or not; and limiting forum shopping in cases where nationwide injunctions are
sought by requiring that such cases be transferred to courts in the District of Columbia. 21
As a related reform, Professor Vladeck has argued that some of the cases that currently are the
basis of much of the shadow docket be litigated before a three-judge district court with a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. Such a process, he argues, would ameliorate some of the infirmities
of the litigation of and decision-making for the emergency orders that form the docket. 22
Vladeck observes that this step would reinstate the lesser-known component of President
Franklin Roosevelt’s storied and failed Court-packing plan in 1937, that was enacted by
Congress that year. As Vladeck points out, FDR was concerned about numerous, individual
district judges issuing injunctions against various New Deal statutes, which would stay in place
while ordinary appeals would grind on. The three-judge district court process would insure that
three federal judges, including at least one appeals judge, rather than mere one possibly outlier
district judge, would render the decision, followed by a prompt direct appeal to and decision by
the Court. This would allow, Vladeck continues, “the merits of the dispute to reach the justices
quickly (by combining the function of two levels of lower federal courts) but on a full record.” 23
This path was subsequently changed by Congress in 1976, but it should be used again, Vladeck
argues, this time for shadow docket cases, as it would reduce judge-shopping and result in “more
consistent decision making and a more efficient path to full merits review by the Supreme
Court.” 24 Other commentators have also advocated further discussion of this proposal
(sometimes coupled with a requirement that suit be brought in the District of Columbia),
especially in the context of plaintiffs seeking, and obtaining from one district judge, a nationwide
injunction against the enforcement of a federal law or policy. 25
II.
THE 1937 REFORMS, CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL STATUTES AND
POLICIES, AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS

20

Id. at 206.
For discussion of these and other reforms, see BIDEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 209-12; Baude, supra
note 1, at 3-4; Pierce, supra note 3, at 16-19.
22
Vladeck, FDR Second Part, supra note 8.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Jan. 25,
2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-the-nationwide-injunction-problem/; Pierce, supra note
3, at 17; Thomas P. Schmidt, Judicial Minimalism in the Lower Courts, 108 VA. L. REV. 829, 907 (2022); Mila
Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 995-96 (2020).
21
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Grounded as they are in history, Professor Vladeck’s suggestions can be evaluated by using the
experience of similar practices in the federal courts. First considered is the use of the three-judge
district court of litigate constitutional changes to federal statutes, followed by the separate
example of the occasional use by some statutes of the federal courts in the District of Columbia
to litigate such challenges. This Part of the Essay is mainly descriptive in nature, regarding the
use of three-judge district courts as the institution for constitutional challenges to federal statutes
in various contexts. Part III of the Essay will be mainly evaluative, considering Professor
Vladeck’s proposal in light of that experience.
A. The 1937 Reform and the Three-Judge District Court
Since Congress established the Courts of Appeals in 1891, and given subsequent statutory
developments, most civil and criminal cases in the federal courts have been litigated in the
familiar pattern of proceedings before a single District Judge; followed by an appeal as of right
to a regional Court of Appeals; and followed by a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which
has the discretion to grant or deny. 26 A notable exception to this pattern came in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s then-controversial decision in 1908 in Ex parte Young, 27 which recognized an
exception to state sovereign immunity by permitting plaintiffs to bring constitutional challenges
to state statutes in federal court by suing not the State, but the state official charged with
enforcing the law. The decision was controversial because it enabled plaintiffs (a railroad in Ex
parte Young) to more easily challenge Progressive Era regulatory laws in federal court, and
empowered one federal district judge to enjoin the operation of a statewide law. 28
Congress responded to Ex parte Young in 1910 by enacting legislation which required such suits
to be brought before a three-judge district court, with a direct appeal available to the Supreme
Court. 29 The statute required that the court consist of one district judge and at least one court of
appeals judge, with the third judge being appointed by the Chief Judge of the circuit (typically,
though not always, another district judge). Supporters of the statute thought three judges, rather
than one, would bring greater thought to the important issue of the constitutionality of a state
law, and the result would arouse less public controversy as compared to the decision of a single
judge. The direct appeal provision would make it more probable that any appeal would be more
rapidly resolved as contrasted to the usual appellate process. 30
Constitutional challenges to federal statutes were added to the ambit of the three-judge district
court in 1937. 31 That legislation was a small part of the fabled and failed Court-packing plan
proposed by President Franklin Roosevelt in that year. The plan was primarily a reaction to a
majority of the Supreme Court holding New Deal legislation unconstitutional, but the President
26

See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 28-33 (7th ed. 2015)(discussing changes in 1891 and beyond).
27
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
28
For discussion of Ex parte Young and its aftermath, see Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the
Fate of the Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 106-14 (2008)[hereinafter Solimine, Congress].
29
Act of June 19, 1910, § 266, 36 Stat. 1100 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281).
30
For further discussion of Congressional adoption of the 1910 legislation, see Michael T. Morley, Vertical Stare
Decisis and Three-Judge District Courts, 108 GEO. L.J. 699, 727-30 (2020); Solimine, Congress, supra note 28, at
114-18.
31
Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, 50 Stat. 752 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2282).
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and his supporters in Congress were also concerned with the many suits in the district courts
leading to no less than 1600 separate injunctions of legislation. 32 They argued that constitutional
challenges to federal statutes should be treated with “equal dignity” to that against state
statutes, 33 and largely tracking the rationale for the 1910 Act, the amendment was passed with
relatively little fanfare in August of 1937, after the Court-packing plan had been rejected. 34
Professor Vladeck is right to draw parallels between proposed reforms of the present shadow
docket and the 1937 reform. In both there were concerns with possibly outlier federal district
judges frequently enjoining federal legislation and policies. Forum- and judge-shopping
shopping seem to characterize both eras. As the Supreme Court later observed in a case
challenging certain aspects of the immigration laws, the legislative history of the 1937 Act
indicates that it was “enacted to prevent a single federal judge from being able to paralyze totally
the operation of an entire regulatory scheme…by issuance of a broad injunctive order….[The
history emphasizes] the heavy pecuniary costs of the unforeseen and debilitating interruptions in
the administration of federal law which could be wrought by a single’s judge’s order, and the
great burdens entailed in coping with the harassing actions brought by one after another to
challenge the operation of an entire statutory scheme…until a judge was ultimately found who
would grant the desired injunction.” 35 The passage was written in 1965, but there are obvious
parallels to the recent, numerous district injunctions sought and obtained against federal statutes
and regulatory policies, especially during the Obama and Trump Administrations.
And at least some of the injunctions entered in the mid-1930s arguably were in substance, if not
in form, national or universal relief. 36 Nonetheless, it appears that the appeals from such
injunctions were typically not characterized by modern shadow-docket behavior by litigants or
courts. That is, it appears parties were usually not seeking or obtaining emergency orders in the
Supreme Court to stay lower court decisions while direct appeals were pending, though there are

32

David P. Currie, the Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (1964). See
also Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936,
51 HARV. L. REV. 577, 611 (1938)(referring to the “voluminous outpouring” of district court decisions enjoining
various parts of New Deal legislation).
33
Currie, supra note 32, at 11 (quoting 81 Cong. Rec. 7045 (1937)(remarks of Sen. O’Mahoney)). See also
Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 32, at 617-18 (“[T]he inevitable irritation of Congress at the free-handed way in
which single judges throughout the country enjoined the enforcement of some of the most vital measures ever
enacted, made inevitable the requirement…for a court of three judges to set aside the will of Congress.”)
34
For further discission of the 1937 amendment to the three-judge district court statute, see Currie, supra note 32, at
10-11; Barry Cushman, the Judicial Reforms of 1937, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1045-47 (2020); Morley, supra
note 30, at 734-35; Solimine, Congress, supra note 28, at 124-25.
35
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1963)(citing legislative history of the 1937 Act).
36
There is a lively debate about whether the federal judiciary, until relatively recently, entered injunctions against
federal statutes or policies that purported to apply to the entire country, that is, not simply to the parties to the
lawsuit or the geographic boundaries of the lower court. Compare Sohoni, supra note 25, at 974-76, 982-87 (arguing
that injunctions entered against federal statutes and programs in the 1930s were very similar to the modern national
or universal injunctions) with Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 417, 428, 434-35 (2017)(arguing that injunctions entered against New Deal legislation were limited to the
named parties, and that no national injunctions were entered by federal courts before the 1960s) and Michael T.
Morley, Disaggregating the History of Nationwide Injunctions: A Response to Professor Sohoni, 72 ALA. L. REV.
239, 242 (2020)(arguing that Sohoni’s evidence does not support the conclusion that the federal judiciary had a
practice of issuing defendant-oriented injunctions in the early decades of the twentieth century).
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examples of such orders. 37 If that is the case, though, it was likely due to norms of litigant and
judicial behavior that were distinct from those of the present regarding rapid appeals of such
orders.
The impetus for the 1910 and 1937 legislation eventually faded, and Congress severely cut back
the jurisdiction of the three-judge district court in 1976. In part the reforms were a victim of their
own success. By the 1960s and 1970s, hundreds of three-judge district courts were being
convened each year, and scores of direct appeals were being lodged in the Supreme Court. 38
Most of each were challenges to state statutes, with not coincidentally many related to the
burgeoning Civil Rights era and attendant litigation. Influential figures and organizations in the
legal community, not least of whom were Justices on the Court itself, came to conclude that the
virtual flood of litigation was a burden on both district courts (given the time-consuming
logistics of assembling three judges rather than one to decide a case at the trial) and on the
Supreme Court (given that the direct appeals were ostensibly mandatory and had to be decided
on the merits). Moreover, many argued that the original perceived need for the three-judge
district court process had largely faded, that even controversial and important litigation could be
handled appropriately by a single district judge with the normal appeal process. 39
The criticism of the three-judge district court was driven in substantial part by the large number
of cases concerning state laws. But there is a parallel and largely similar story regarding the
smaller number of cases generated by the 1937 reform. There as well, influential commentators
came to conclude that the court had outlived the usefulness claimed in 1937. For example, the
American Law Institute, in an influential study commissioned by Chief Justice Earl Warren and
published in 1969, concluded that “the conditions that gave rise to the 1937 legislation no longer
exist,” and that other procedural mechanisms “safeguard federal legislation from ill-considered
invalidation by federal district courts.” 40 Similar reasons, referring to the numerous cases and
appeals from challenges to federal and state statutes, were advanced by the another influential
report from the Federal Judicial Center, convened by Chief Justice Warren Burger. 41 The calls
for repeal of the three-judge district court were cast almost exclusively in terms of sound
procedure and judicial administration, as opposed to substantive concerns with the need or output

37
For examples of such orders from the 1920s when direct appeals were permitted for constitutional challenges to
federal statutes, see Hill v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 310 (1921); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Clyne, 260 U.S. 704 (1922). For
more recent examples, see STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 17-13--17-14 (11th ed. 2019).
38
For a discussion of the numbers, see Part II.B. infra.
39
For further discussion of the reasons advanced to abolish the court, see Morley, supra note 30, at 738-44;
Solimine, Congress, supra note 28, at 134-44.
40
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
325 (1969)[hereinafter ALI STUDY]. By other mechanisms, the study referred, id., to the statutory requirement that
the United States be notified of and be permitted to intervene in private suits that raise the constitutionality of a
federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 2403), itself part of the 1937 reform, and the then-provision which permitted direct
appeals to the Supreme Court of any district court holding a federal law unconstitutional (28 U.S.C. § 1252).
41
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972),
reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 596-99 (1972)[hereinafter Freund Report].
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of those courts. 42 With support from jurists and members of Congress of different ideological
stripes, the court was abolished in 1976, 43 save for an exception for reapportionment cases. 44
Despite the almost complete abolishment in 1976, the three-judge district court has enjoyed a
robust afterlife. Left standing was a separate such court established by the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, to decide declaratory judgment actions regarding whether certain States and political
subdivisions were, in making changes to election laws, subject to preclearance by the
Department of Justice. 45 Since the 1976 repeal, several federal statutes have been passed in the
past several decades with judicial review provisions for that particular law, mandating that any
constitutional challenges thereto be litigated before a three-judge district court, with a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. 46 It is not uncommon for proposed federal legislation that some
may feel may have constitutional problems or otherwise concern particularly important policies
to be accompanied by such provisions. 47
B. Three-Judge District Courts and Constitutional Challenges to State and
Federal Statutes: Empirical Studies
The usefulness of the three-judge district court as a procedural vehicle for suits, that may
ameliorate the perceived deficiencies of the shadow docket, can be informed by empirical
evaluations of the operation of those courts in other contexts. First consider the use of the court
for constitutional challenges to state legislation, which by far outnumbered suits challenging
federal statutes. James Walker and I recently conducted such a study. 48 We were especially
42

Solimine, Congress, supra note 28, at 143-48.
Act of Aug.12, 1976, Pub.L. No.94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2284). The other statutes
permitting direct appeals from single district judges holding federal statutes unconstitutional were repealed in 1988.
Pub. L. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662. See generally Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids
Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81 (1988).
44
The reasons for the exception are not clear from the legislative record. Based on that limited record and the chorus
of critics in general of the three-judge district court, it was apparently thought that reapportionment cases were still
important and controversial ones, raising difficult issues of federal-state relations, that would benefit from continued
adjudication before three-judge district courts. See Carolyn Shapiro, Docket Control, Mandatory Jurisdiction, and
the Supreme Court’s Failure in Rucho v. Common Cause, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 301, 309-13; Michael E. Solimine,
Institutional Loyalty and the Design of Partisan Gerrymandering Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 14 NYU J.
LAW & LIBERTY 171, 179-81 (2020).
45
Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10304. For discussion of the legislative history of this
provision, see Solimine, Congress, supra note 28, at 132-33. This provision became dormant when the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional section 4 of the Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b), the provision which determined which States
and political subdivisions were covered by the preclearance requirements. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013).
46
For discussion of these laws and their legislative history, see Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of
Specialized Federal Constitutional Courts, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 128-36 (2014)[hereinafter Solimine, Fall and
Rise].
47
Id. at 131-32. For recent examples, see For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2019); Freedom to Vote,
John R. Lewis Act, H.R. 5746, § 4, 117th Cong. (2022); Carl Hulse, Bipartisan Bill Aims to Block Jan.6 Abuses,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2022, at A1, A17 (proposed amendments to the Electoral Count Act provide that claims against
a State’s slate of electors could be challenged through a three-judge district court with a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court).
48
Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Strange Career of the Three-Judge District Court: Federalism and
Civil Rights, 1954-1976, 72 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 909 (2022). Prior empirical studies of three-judge district court
decisions regarding state statutes were more limited than ours in coverage. Id. at 929-30.
43
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interested in analyzing the increase in such suits during the Civil Rights Era and its aftermath in
the 1960s and 1970s. Three-judge district courts for all situations were convened in hundreds of
cases each year during that period, until severely falling off after the 1976 legislation. 49
Similarly, starting in the early 1960s and continuing into the late 1970s, direct appeals decided
on the merits by the Supreme Court took up scores of cases each Term. 50
We took a closer examination of 885 decisions in the district courts challenging state statutes
(the original purpose of the 1910 Act) from 1954 (the beginning of the Warren Court and a proxy
for the start of the civil rights era) until 1976, when Congress greatly restricted the coverage of
the three-judge district court. 51 Among other things, we found at the trial level that most
constitutional challenges were raised under the Fourteenth Amendment (i.e., due process or
equal protection), voting rights, free expression, and race; and that in total the courts granted (in
whole or in part) 51 percent of the injunctions ought by plaintiffs. 52 Almost half of the decisions
resulted in a direct appeal. Of those, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed 44%, and with
merits opinions affirmed or reversed in and 12% and 11%, respectively (with the remainder
being resolved by dismissals or in other ways). 53
The Supreme Court’s disposition of the appeals raises issues relevant to the present Essay. Most
striking is that despite the direct appeal provision, which might imply than an explanatory
opinion on the merits is expected, 54 almost half of the appeals resulted in a summary affirmance
with no such opinion. Almost always the summary affirmances were made without extended
briefing or oral argument. 55 These shadow docket-like dispositions illustrate an unusual aspect of
the Court’s jurisprudence in dealing with the statutes setting up three-judge district courts. For
many decades the Court has interpreted the statutes in an openly and unapologetic narrow
manner, to minimize its mandatory docket and keep most of its docket discretionary through
writs of certiorari. 56
The summary dispositions have led to another jurisprudential problem for the Court to grapple
with, one that it never satisfactorily resolved. What precedential weight, if any, should the
49

Id. at 947 (tbl. 1)(relying on data reported in the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
Id. at 948 (tbl. 2).
51
We constructed a database of relevant district court decisions through Westlaw searches. For details on those
searches and other methodological aspects of the study, see id. at 974-75.
52
Id. at 948-49 (tbls. 3-5).
53
Id. at 950-51 (tbls. 7-8).
54
Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E. Solimine, Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy,
107 GEO. L.J. 413, 424 (2019).
55
SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 5-57—5-63.
56
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Automatic Emps. Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98 (1974)(“only a narrow construction is
consonant with the overriding policy, historically encouraged by Congress, of minimizing the mandatory docket of
this Court in the interests of sound judicial administration”)(footnote omitted); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S.
246, 251 (1941)(statutes were “not measure[s] of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality, but
as…enactment[s] technical in the strict sense and to be applied as such.”). The statement in Phillips came to be “the
Court’s favorite quotation” on how the three-judge district court statutes should be interpreted. 17A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4234 at 197 (2007)(footnote omitted). The canon of
construction was applied in cases regarding, e.g., when a three-judge district court should be convened, when relief
other than an injunction was sought, and whether the federal issue needed to be “substantial.” The classic and
critical survey of the Court’s arguably confusing and inconsistent application of the canon is Currie, supra note 32.
The Court still invokes the canon, see Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018).
50
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numerous summary dispositions have? One option would be no weight at all, given the lack of
full briefing and an explanatory opinion. Not taking that route, the Court has stated that the
summary affirmances are strictly speaking on the merits, 57 and entitled to some precedential
weight, depending on how close the facts are to a subsequent case. 58 This muddled standard has
understandably confused lower courts and commentators. 59
There is apparently no parallel study of the three-judge district courts convened for constitutional
challenges to federal statutes under the 1937 Act. There are at least two complimentary ways to
engage in such a study. One would parallel my study with Walker, and assemble a database of
such cases at the district court level. Another would be to identify relevant Supreme Court
decisions which have their origin in cases governed by the 1937 Act. Fortuitously there is a
recently created database that permits use of the latter approach. Professor Keith E. Whittington
has assembled a Judicial Review of Congress Database of every Supreme Court decision, from
1789 to the present, that ruled on the merits of a constitutional challenge to a federal statute. 60
Drawing on that database, I determined which decisions from the passage of the 1937 Act to
1978 were direct appeals from three-judge district courts. 61
According to the Judicial Review Database, in this time frame there are approximately 400
Supreme Court decisions that reached the merits of a constitutional challenge to a federal statute.
Of those, 64 were direct appeals from three-judge district courts. 62 The federal statute was
upheld in 46 and determined to be unconstitutional, in whole or in part, in 18. They include
57

E.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
E.g., Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977)(per curiam).
59
See SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 4-80—4-82; Douglas & Solimine, supra note 54, at 424-27.
60
See Keith E. Whittington, The Judicial Review of Congress Database,
https:/scholar.princeton.edu/kewhitt/judicial-review-congress-database. For further discussion and analysis of the
database, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS OF CONGRESS FROM THE
FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT (2019).
61
All the cases in the database with variables coded for each are available at the website cited in note 60 supra.
Among the variables coded was whether the Court’s decision came up by way of a writ of certiorari, or not. See
Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Dataset Description of Variables 4 (January 2019), available at
the database website. I checked the cases that did not come up on certiorari to determine which were direct appeals
from three-judge district courts. I checked decisions for two years after the 1976 legislation, because it did not apply
retroactively, and there were cases in the pipeline that eventually reached the Court in 1977 or 1978. A list of the
cases is available from the author and on file with the Indiana Law Journal. The database does not include Court
decisions which did not reach the merits, e.g., were dismissed on jurisdictional or other non-merits grounds.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 60, at 317. Thus, excluded were direct appeals from three-judge district courts which
dismissed for lack of standing, see, e.g., Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), aff’g 21 F. Supp. 947
(E.D. Tenn. 1938)(three-judge court); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), rev’g, 267 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y.
1967)(three-judge court). See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 169 n.2 (1974)(decision not in
database, reversing Court of Appeals decision holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the CIA Act
regarding the secrecy of the CIA’s budget, and noting that the lower courts considered but decided not to convene a
three-judge district court). Conversely, the database includes a small number of cases not governed by the 1937 Act,
but from a statute that had its own provision requiring constitutional challenges to be brought before a three-judge
district court. E.g., Nixon v. Adm Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977)(Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act of 1974).
62
The number does not include about 60 cases involving federal constitutional issues that came up on a direct
appeal, but not from a three-judge district court decision. Most of these were direct appeals statutorily authorized
from convictions in federal criminal cases, or other cases, and those statutes were eventually repealed in 1988, see
note 43 supra.
58
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several notable decisions familiar to students of constitutional law. 63 The rate of invalidation
appears to be about the same as it is for all the decisions in the database for the 1937-1978
period. 64 So this route of cases to the Court’s docket was not an avenue to either frequently
uphold or invalidate federal statutes, and by result if nothing else seems to mirror the disposition
of cases that arrived at the merits docket by other means.
The record of those cases can be compared to the larger number of direct appeals of three-judge
district courts in cases challenging state statutes. Of the 64 decisions, only two were summary
dispositions. 65 Other than not facing the large number of appeals for state statutes, perhaps the
Court felt an institutional obligation to not send a signal, even if unintended, that it was not
taking a suit against a federal statute seriously. In contrast, the Court in cases dealing with
federal statutes repeated the mantra that the statutes setting up the three-judge court system with
direct appeals were to be construed narrowly. 66
C. Exclusive Jurisdiction of Three-Judge District Courts in the District of
Columbia
While Professor Vladeck has not so argued, others have suggested that a three-judge district
court requirement should include a provision, not found in the 1910 and 1937 iterations, that
exclusive venue for the action be in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 67
Several reasons can be advanced in favor of such exclusivity. Start with the notion that reducing
venue to one district will limit or eliminate forum shopping. Critics of a particular judge’s
decision to issue an injunction against a federal law will no longer be able to label it the result of
a plaintiff’s selecting a predisposed jurist. 68 Another reason is that when a federal statute or
policy is at issue, it makes some sense for the case to be litigated in the national seat of the
federal government, not unlike venue being appropriate in the federal courts in a state when that
63

See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)(intrastate activity and Commerce Clause); United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947)(Hatch Act); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964)(Title II of 1964 Civil Rights Act); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)(residency requirement for
welfare); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)(sex discrimination); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976)(Tenth Amendment challenge).
64
See WHITTINGTON, supra note 60, at 26 (fig. 1-1, comparing numbers of upholding and invalidations from 1791
to 2011).
65
See Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972), sum. aff’g, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972)(three-judge court);
Chief of the Cap. Police v. Jeannette Rankin Brigade, 409 U.S. 972 (1972), sum. aff’g, 342 F. Supp. 575 (D.D.C.
1972)(three-judge court). The Richardson affirmance did cite a case in support. See Richardson, 409 U.S. at 1069
(citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)).
66
See, e.g., Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 606 (1960)(three judge court need not be convened when
constitutionality of federal statute is at issue, absent a request for an injunction); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 155 (1963)(three-judge court need not be convened when only a declaratory judgement was sought); Swift
& Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1965)(decision not in database, holding that claim arising under
Supremacy Clause does not fall within ambit of three-judge court statutes, in part due to the Court’s “constrictive”
interpretation of those statutes). Compare Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1965)(challenge to immigration laws
substantial enough to justify convening of three judge court); Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947)(1937 Act
applies to as-applied challenges to federal statutes, in addition to facial challenges).
67
See, e.g., Costa, supra note 25. Vladeck has instead argued that the government could be given the option of
seeking transfer of such suits to the District of Columbia courts. See BIDEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at
211 & n.72 (summarizing Vladeck testimony).
68
Sohoni, supra note 25, at 995-96.
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state’s laws are challenged. This seems especially apt when the suit involves a nationwide or
universal injunction.
Finally, the federal judges in the District of Columbia, at both the trial and appellate levels, have
a long-standing and by most accounts well-earned reputation for being particularly excellent and
smart jurists, especially though not only for administrative law matters. 69 The best of both these
worlds could combine in a three-judge court consisting of at least one judge from both levels.
For many of these reasons, Congress has long vested permissive or exclusive jurisdiction in the
U.S. Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia for many court challenges to the actions of
federal administrative agencies. 70
There are impressive counterarguments that can be made. True, exclusive venue in the District of
Columbia will limit or eliminate forum shopping. But when coupled with a direct review
provision to the Supreme Court, it will also deprive the Court of the benefits of percolation. That
is, currently different federal judges around the country, at both the trial and appellate levels,
might come out the same on the same challenge to a federal law, and the Court can take that into
in deciding whether to grant or deny certiorari. If different courts come out differently, it may
benefit the Court in making its own decision resolving the conflict. 71 Nor it is obvious, with all
due respect to the estimable federal judges in the District of Columbia, whether they have
superior legal acumen as compared to their able counterparts throughout the United States. Nor
is clear that judges ensconced in the District will have a better sense of national issues or that
their decisions will be more accepted, inside or outside the legal community, as compared to the
federal courts elsewhere in the United States. 72 Also, confirmation battles over the federal judges
appointed for the District of Columbia may become more contentious if that District is the sole
venue for resolution of suits for nationwide injunctions against federal programs.
For further guidance we can look to two examples of three-judge district courts with exclusive
venue in the District of Columbia. One is the now dormant 73 Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, which required certain States that historically discriminated against the voting rights of
Black Americans to preclear their changes to elections with the U.S. Department of Justice, or
file a declaratory judgment action with a three-judge district court in the District of Columbia.
69

Solimine, Fall and Rise, supra note 46, at 148-49. A related reason that federal judges in the District of Columbia
are highly regarded is that the President may appoint those judges without the hurdle of Senatorial courtesy, as is
true for the judges serving in the States. However, due to changes in the Senate’s filibuster rules, and the changing
perception and reality that appointments to the D.C. Circuit are a steppingstone to the Supreme Court, the
nomination and confirmation process has become increasingly politicized. Id. at 149-50. This may diminish the
perceived advantage of a more expert and apolitical judiciary in the District.
70
See Eric M. Fraser, et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2013).
71
Solimine, Fall and Rise, supra note 46, at 142-44. On the other hand, some are skeptical of the purported benefits
of percolation, given the uncertainty created by different judge ruling different ways, and the arguable lack of
evidence that the Supreme Court (or lower courts) frequently internalize or use the additional information supplied
by percolation. See Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Percolation’s Value, 73 STAN. L. REV. 363 (2021); Solimine,
Fall and Rise, supra note 46, at 144-45.
72
Bradford Mank & Michael E. Solimine, State Standing and National Injunctions, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1955,
1979-80 (2019). See also Alan Gura, Congressional Democrats’ Court Picking (Not Packing) Scheme, WALL ST.J.,
May 10, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/congressional-democrats-court-picking-not-court-packing-scheme11620684937.
73
See note 45 supra.
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The latter venue was selected, the historical record shows, because it was thought that federal
judges there would give the Voting Rights Act more expansively and sympathetic treatment than
might federal judges in the covered jurisdictions. 74 Affected jurisdictions overwhelmingly used
the administrative process to preclear their changes, but between 1972 and 2012, such
jurisdictions filed 92 declaratory judgment actions. 75 Fifty-nine of those were dismissed by the
parties or the courts, leaving 33 that were resolved on the merits. Of those, the courts granted a
declaratory judgment in favor of the jurisdiction in 18 cases and denied in 15. Fifteen of the
decisions were appealed to the Supreme Court, which held oral arguments and rendered full
opinions in eight and summarily affirmed or dismissed the others. 76 The court side of
preclearance, then, did not impose substantial burdens on either the district or the Supreme
Court, despite the considerable activity involved in the administration of preclearance.
The other example is the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, popularly known as
the McCain-Feingold law, which regulates campaign financing for elections to federal office,
and requires that any constitutional challenges be filed before a three-judge district court in the
District of Columbia, with a direct appeal available to the Supreme Court. 77 The legislative
history of this provision is sparce, but the rationale for the provision appears to be that First
Amendment challenges to various provisions of the BCRA were expected, relatively rapid
resolution of the challenges were intended, and the federal judges in the District of Columbia had
the political sophistication and legal acumen to expertly deal with the inevitable litigation. 78
The drafters of the provision predicted correctly. By my count, there have been at least ten such
challenges to various provisions of the BCRA, from 2003 to 2022. 79 All of the district court
decisions have been appealed, and the Supreme Court has promptly held oral argument and
resolved them with full opinions in six, while summarily affirming or disposing of four others. 80
It is not clear how much value-added was the special review provision, 81 but on the whole, the
BCRA litigation was not particularly procedural controversial or burdensome to the courts (the
substance of the cases was another matter).

74

Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking District of Columbia Venue in Voting Rights Preclearance Actions, 29 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 29, 31-32 (2014).
75
Id. at 33, 37.
76
Id. at 37. There was preclearance litigation outside of the District of Columbia as well, since the Attorney General
was permitted to sue locally when a jurisdiction failed to seek preclearance, and the Supreme Court also held that
private parties have an implied right of action to do so. Id. at 38. I am not aware of an empirical study of these
Section 5 enforcement actions, but at least 100 were filed between 1982 and 2006, and between 1971 and 2008 at
least 12 of those were appealed to the Supreme Court. Id at 39 nn. 63-64.
77
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 113, § 403(a).
78
Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme
Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 772-75 (2007); Joshua Panas, Note, Out of Control? Congressional Power to Shape
Judicial Review of New Legislation, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 164-66 (2002).
79
See Michael Solimine, Partisan Balance in Three-Judge District Courts under BCRA, Election Law Blog, June 3,
2016, https://electionlawblog.org/?p=83380 (referring to nine cases). The tenth case is FEC v. Cruz, 142 S. Ct. 1638
(2022).
80
Solimine, Fall and Rise, supra note 46, at 129 nn. 52-53 (listing BCRA cases from 2002 to 2014).
81
Cf. id. at 146-47 (discussing whether percolation might have aided the Supreme Court in the absence of the
special review provision, and noting that the Court in the BCRA cases seemed to draw relatively little on the legal
analysis of the three-judge district court opinions). The same conclusion might be drawn regarding the Court’s latest
BCRA decision, FEC v. Cruz, which made only fleeting references to the lower court opinion.
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III.

SHOULD THE THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT BE REVIVED TO RESPOND TO THE
SHADOW DOCKET?

An evaluation of proposals to reinstate a three-judge district court with a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court, to ameliorate some of the perceived problems of the shadow docket, can be
informed by the history of past iterations of the three-judge district court.
The evaluation can be organized around several factors Professor Vladeck identified in his
proposal. Start with the coverage of the court. He observes that “[r]easonable minds will differ as
to exactly what cases should go to such panels, but it’s increasingly clear that many should.” 82
The 1910 and 1937 Acts covered federal constitutional challenges to state and federal statutes,
respectively. Simply to literally reinstate these statutes is surely not what Vladeck has in mind.
Although shadow docket cases can come from challenges in federal court to federal or state law,
the main thrust of the critics of the docket is the former. But any literal reinstatement of the 1937
Act would be overinclusive; any particular challenge to a federal statue or its application will not
necessarily raise issues of a national or universal injunction, to which the shadow docket is
closely but not inextricably tied. 83 But it also could be underinclusive: shadow docket cases can
involve not the constitutionality of a federal statute, but non-constitutional questions regarding
the administrative application or executive enforcement of federal statutes. 84 One approach
would be a statute that covers challenges to the legality of a federal statute, or its application by
executive orders or otherwise, but coupled with coverage of only those cases where plaintiff
seeks a national injunction.
Professor Vladeck also argues that the proposal would “allow the merits of the dispute to reach
the justices quickly…but on a full record[,]” which would lead to “more consistent decision
making and a more efficient path to full merits review by the Supreme Court.” 85 These are
laudable goals, but it not entirely clear how the proposal would lead to their effectuation. On a
full record being assembled, in many shadow docket cases a decision on an injunction by a
single district court is reviewed, often bypassing the Courts of Appeals on a stay application. The
proposal seems to contemplate that three federal judges working together would be able to, with
the aid of the attorneys, assemble a full record to enable better review by the Supreme Court,
either on stay application or a plenary review of a judgment (or sequentially both).
This too is a laudable goal, but past experience is not encouraging. One of the criticisms of the
three-judge district court was that it was logistically awkward for multimember trial courts,
constituted temporarily by judges pulled from other courts, to permit full adjudication and
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Vladeck, FDR Second Part, supra note 8.
As Professor Vladeck has observed, cases where a nationwide injunction is sought account for “only one modest
slice of the shadow docket,” BIDEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 234 n.71 (quoting Vladeck testimony).
There are other controversial uses of the docket, e.g., summary reversals (some explained, some not) in qualified
immunity, death penalty, and religious liberty cases that do not involve such injunctions.
84
Since the 1910 and 1937 Acts were limited to constitutional challenges to federal and state statutes, courts had to
grapple with the issue of requiring a three-judge district court to be convened for a challenge to the application of
those statutes, as compared to a challenge to the underlying statute. For an extensive critique of the sometimesinconsistent answers the Supreme Court and lower courts provided, see Currie, supra note 32, at 37-55.
85
Vladeck, FDR Second Part, supra note 8.
83
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assemble a full record. 86 In one well-known case, involving a challenge to a state statute, the
Supreme Court remanded for further fact-finding by the three-judge panel. 87 Perhaps this
problem was the exception, not the rule, but it seems likely to recur. That said, the three-judge
district court process may enable the Court to better engage in plenary review at the stay stage if
it comes to that. In other words, it could reduce the ability of litigants to forum- and judge-shop,
while accelerating the Court’s opportunity to review the merits of the case on fuller record, even
at the stay stage.
A mandatory appeal provision may be thought to encourage the Supreme Court to issue full
explanatory opinions on appeal from three-judge district courts, whether on stay applications or
otherwise. This would address the problem of the shadow docket decisions that are
underexplained or not explained at all. Again, past practice suggests this may not always happen.
As outlined above, the Court from 1954 to 1976 summarily disposed of over 40 percent of the
direct appeals in cases involving challenges to state statutes. In contrast, there was only a tiny
number of such dispositions in challenges to federal statutes. Much will likely depend on the
number of cases that come to the Court by direct appeal, depending on the coverage of cases by
an adopted proposal. The larger number of such cases, the more summary, shadow-docket-like
dispositions are probable. 88
That said, the Court may be less likely to fall back on such a practice given its current
historically shrunken docket, and a renewed interest in reinstating some mandatory appeals. To
be sure, Congressional adoption of the Judges’ Bill in 1925, heavily promoted by Chief Justice
William Howard Taft, was a seismic event which gave the Court almost total discretion via
certiorari to control its own merits docket. 89 But the change has not been without controversy, as
it arguably calls into question the ability of the Court to objectively apply the rule of law with
public legitimacy. 90

86
See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 2-25. See also Freund Report, supra note 41, at 599 (“A three-judge court is
not well adapted for the trial of factual issues. Courts of that kind are reluctant to hold an evidentiary trial, even
when there are factual matters to explore, and the judges are likely either to attempt to induce the parties to stipulate
facts, where often a trial might be advisable, or to resort to procedural devices to shortcut the factual hearing.”)
Contemporary accounts from lawyers who practiced before three judge courts agreed. E.g., Alfred L. Scanlan, The
Trial and Appeal of Constitutional Issues, 20 CATH. LAW. 386, 389-90 (1974).
87
Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478-89 (1971)(per curiam). Critics added that this “situation” was “far from
uncommon.” Freund Report, supra note 41, at 599. Presently, if an appeal is taken of a decision granting or denying
a request for a preliminary (as compared to a permanent) injunction, there may not be as complete a record given
possibly truncated hearings and discovery. This could be true whether the decision is from a single judge or a threejudge district court.
88
In addition to summary dispositions, the Court could also use such avoidance doctrines like standing (e.g., Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018)) or the political question doctrine (e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484
(2019)) to delay or avoid rulings in particularly difficult or controversial cases on direct appeal from three-judge
district courts. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 48, at 946 n.155 (discussing such avoidance mechanisms in this
context).
89
It is then curious that apparently neither Taft nor anyone else at the time seriously considered limiting or
abandoning the direct appeals mandated by the 1910 legislation. It seems that they thought they were an exception
justified by the perceived importance of the cases. Solimine, Congress, supra note 28, at 123-24.
90
See Matthew J. Franck, The Problem of Judicial Supremacy, NAT’L AFF., Spring 2016, at 137, 147-49; Edward A.
Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1643, 1713-30 (2000).
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Throughout much of American history, even after 1925, and at least until the 1976 Act,
mandatory appeals constituted significant percentages of the Court’s merits docket. 91 Not
coincidentally with recent concerns over the shadow docket, there have been increased calls for
reviving the Court’s mandatory docket. 92 The possibility of the Court falling back on the use of
summary dispositions to handle an increased caseload from mandatory appeals could be
ameliorated by the Court not giving any precedential weight to such orders (nor expecting lower
courts to). If the appeal, whether of a stay order or on the merits, does not earn full treatment by
the Court, then it should not earn the honor of enjoying stare decisis effect. 93
A recent shadow docket order, on a direct appeal from a three-judge district court, illustrates the
possible options for the Court if Professor Vladeck’s proposal was implemented. In Merrill v.
Milligan 94 the Court considered an application to stay the reapportionment decision of the
district court which held that Alabama had violated the Voting Rights Act when drawing
Congressional districts. 95 In a brief order by a 5-4 vote, the Court granted a stay but also noted
probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument on the merits in the 2022 Term. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh defended the stay by arguing that the district court’s
remedial order of redrawing Congressional districts came too close to impending primary
elections. 96 In a dissent, Justice Kagan charged that the majority was “us[ing] its shadow docket
to signal or make changes in the law, without anything approaching full briefing and
argument.” 97 In this high-profile case, the majority combined an unarticulated stay order with
explanatory opinions by concurring and dissenting Justices. The separate explanatory opinions
and their content make Merrill less of an objectionable shadow docket decision.
Finally, consider proposals to lodge a new three-judge district court in the District of Columbia.
The use of that option seems to have worked reasonably well for preclearance under the Voting
Rights Act, and for constitutional challenges to the BCRA. I nonetheless have previously
expressed some skepticism of that option. No doubt that it would achieve the worthy goal of
limiting forum shopping. But it does so at the cost of prohibiting any percolation in the lower
courts, and of violating the general norm of the regional dispersion of venue in the federal courts,
and in my judgment, there are reasons, but not strong ones, to automatically make the District of
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Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 879-82 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). On the timing of relief issue, Justice Kavanaugh relied
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curiam).
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Columbia the sole venue. 98 A less drastic option could be to permit venue in any appropriate
district court, but permit multiple suits, if there are any, to be consolidated in one district, using
first-in-time filing and other factors. 99
CONCLUSION
In his seminal article, Professor Baude argued that the Supreme Court in most of its low-profile
cases “behave[d] in a professional, organized, and lawyerly manner.” But, he added, it “is just in
the hot-button, high-stakes, sharply divided cases that law runs out and politics and personal
preferences take over.” The Court’s shadow docket decisions, he concluded, sometimes “deviate
from its otherwise high standards of transparency and legal craft.” 100
Some critics of the shadow docket, led by Professor Vladeck, have argued that the Court’s
transparency and legal craft can be enhanced by Congress requiring that certain cases, now
typically litigated on that docket, be adjudicated in three-judge district courts with a direct appeal
to the Court. Such a process could indeed ameliorate some of the perceived problems of the
shadow docket, such as forum shopping and the frequent lack of explanatory opinions by the
Court, and in doing so enhance and perhaps restore the public legitimacy of both the Court and
lower federal courts. These would be no small accomplishments, especially given heightened
partisanship that in the public mind seems to characterize the actions of many public officials,
judges included, 101 but policymakers should undertake these reforms with an appreciation of the
decidedly contentious history of prior iterations of the three-judge district court, which led to
Congress significantly limiting the jurisdiction of that court in 1976. The upsides of a revival of
the court almost a half-century later may not outweigh the downsides, and so should only done
by Congress after further input from the Court, and other stakeholders inside and outside the
legal community.
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